Ford Friendly wrote:Actually, it's not particularly "short-sighted" if you consider that Canada claims to be a single uinfied structure.
So much for the "true believer" side of the argument.
The reality is that as long as there are different weapons systems, different commanders in control of those weapons systems will want to "build their empires" and control more things. It's basic human (and demogogue) instinct. just think about how the aviation assets were split in the US in the 50's - -- Army allowed helo's as well as tactical missiles (including nukes), Navy allowed the whole gamut, Air Force demanding it have everything flyable (and imaginable) everything except undersea-launched missiles.
The result - multiple logistical battles, conflicting and confusing command and control structures, and airframe development battles that took 50 years to resolve to the point where we finally have a "single airframe" for a multi-service fighter of the future (F-35).
Then again, I've always been a pragmatist, not an empire-builder or an idealist.
It is hard to separate the 'emotion' from realities. When the AF became a separate service it acknowledged the need for focus on capabilities and potentials in a particular and unique service. It is difficult for a single command/service to comprehend and apply all the capabilities.
Examples would be shown in the 'consolidated' wing structures in Korea. The Air forces were assigned to areas and using one assigned set of assets to cover another area was overly complex. The result was that one area needed support while another was relatively quiet. But the coordination was lacking to easily facilitate any crossover. Later the more comprehensive programs made forces available to the theater as a whole rather than by a specific area. The concept of centralized command and control worked much better in VN. Even so, There were specific missions that were handled as a separate entity. SAC and MAC would be the prime examples.
The priciples are always established in Doctrine and that is by the separate services. That is based on overall National Strategy. National strategy also considers force structure and capabilities. When short-falls are found one or more of the services is structured to meet the shortfall.
With unlimited resources that is not a problem. However that is also not reality. Thus the DoD is faced with estimating the needs and then building forces to meet the needs. That means weighing how the various services can build forces to meet those needs.
In the past, the primary focus was on Strategic Warfare as shown in the nuclear bomber, missile and SLBM forces. The primary plan was called the Single Integrated Operations Plan(SIOP). A single agency, The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) corrdinated and planned strikes using the forces from SAC, the NAVY and the ARMY. Various levels were planned including some Tactical weapons. (Strategic warfare is loosely defined as the situation when the national survial of the combatants is at stake)
Tactical warfare is also high on the list of priorities. And the competion for resources is more aggresive there. Planners must take a more coordinated view of missions in Tactical warfare. Logistics becomes a very high priority. Movement of troop, weapons, and ammunition is vital to success. (Beans and bullets). Usually the emphasis is on troops on the ground and occupation of territory. Of course that brings Close Air Support
Tactical Logistics, and Reconnaissance into play heavily. The scope also changes from very low level operations to some covering an entire area.
Each has a set of requirements that require versitile forces from an AF perspective. As the fight goes on, each unit has support needs that must be weighed at some higher level and force allocation within a theater is vital to success.
In between, you have other operational requirements. Strategic and Tactical Recon for example. Those are met by both air breathers and satellite. Including some down at the tactical level (Witness the big discussion over UAVs).
Every commander and command (at every level) wants to have instantaneous control over all the possible assets he can get. Each would like his own airlift, supply, weapon support, etc. That becomes very cumbersome at times. For that reason, you have specialists handling a particular asset (empire?) I don't think that is illogical. I would rather have someone with intimate knowledge of his system running it than someone with only 'familiarity' with a system. Regardless of service, there is a need for specialized knowledge. I would not want a rifleman (although all infantry are riflemen) planning and deploying my artillery or helo support. That takes special training.
The end result has to be very close coordination from the top to the bottom to effectively apply military forces. Each command has to take into account their mission and plan accordingly. Force structure estimates are based on mission descriptions and those are keyed into various war plans (either strategic or tactical). Much of the bickering that happens is a result of not enough coordination of all the elements needed in a plan.
Most of that in-fighting takes place at the DoD and budget level. There are groups that must argue for each weapon system and address how NOT to lose mission capability.
Waugh! I wrote a book and only barely scratched the surface of this complex process. The key issue is the same one you encounter in any endeavor- Which will work best? A centralized architecture or one with
distributed responsibility and accountability. There is no direct answer, There is only opinion as far as effectiveness is concerned. You will easily find advocates for both concepts.
